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Abstract 
Policy must be theoretically informed and appropriately targeted if it is to be effective 
(Kerr et al., 2011). In probation-managed drug policy, this demands an appropriate 
theory framework within which the multi-dimensional nature of problematic drug use 
can be understood. To engender genuine justice in such policy, theory must give 
‘proper weight to both structure and agency, in continuous interaction’ (Bottoms, 2004) 
(agency refers to the ability of individuals to act of their own free will and structure 
refers to the social, legal and economic institutions, arrangements and practices which 
can facilitate, or indeed constrain, the agents’ capacity to do so). This article responds 
to these challenges by presenting a theory of ‘social capital portfolios’ which was 
developed from the social capital; substance misuse and desistance literatures and 
refined through an 18-month longitudinal study of probation-managed drug 
interventions. The theory is used here to critically evaluate contemporary probation 
drug policy and developments and to make recommendations on what constitutes 
criminal and social justice. 
Keywords: Agency, criminal justice, desistance, Drug Rehabilitation Requirement, 
social capital, structure 
What is justice in drug policy? 
For a system to justifiably call itself ‘criminal justice’ it should only criminalize that 
which individuals can reasonably be expected to refrain from and should respond 
eruditely to that which it criminalizes. This is imperative in coercive drug 
interventions where inappropriate or ill-informed policy can not only exacerbate 
problematic lifestyles and engender ‘criminality,’ but promote exclusion and prolong 
existing health problems; none of which could be termed ‘justice’. 
McNeill (2009: 23) makes the crucial but frequently overlooked observation that 
probation is not just about reducing offending but is an agency of justice, advocating 
the need to attend not only to ‘what works’ but to what is ‘just’. Contemporary risk 
narratives have historically conflicted with this type of thinking by polarizing drug 
users and the rest of the ‘non-using’ population, on the pretext that the latter are at 
risk from the dangerous former (Seddon et al., 2008). How then might policy 
achieve this justice that McNeill speaks of for both drug users and the people 
around them? 
The World Health Organization (WHO) says policy should respond with sanctions 
to heavy use which damages others and respond with treatment to that which does 
not (World Health Organization, 2009). This position promotes liberty at all levels; 
the focus on heavy usage implies a level of drug use as a right (which the law 
arguably already endorses since alcohol and cigarette consumption are legal), with 
intervention only if that right is pursued to the extent that it infringes on the liberty 
of others, that is, if drug use results in individuals harming others, for example 
committing crime against them. Such an approach is within the proper remit of state 
intervention (Mill, 1859) and already evident in some UK laws, including smokers 
being criminalized only if they impact on others’ health through passive smoking. 
Importantly, the World Health Organization recommend measured responses to 
drug use which harms others through drug courts with flexible sentencing options, 
which they deem ‘more likely to build healthier and safer societies than 
incarceration’ (World Health Organization, 2009: 2). This demonstrates an 
understanding that policy needs the capacity to respond to the range of dynamics 
which engender drug use and that this varies by individual. This is crucial in the 
establishment of justice for drug users: penal responses are only reasonable where 
an individual is making a choice to offend against others (i.e. an agency level 
decision, made with intent); rehabilitation is the appropriate response for that which 
is outside an individual’s control (i.e. structural issues such as unstable housing or 
homelessness, ill health, or lack of employment opportunities). Realistically, most 
sentences will need to incorporate elements of both, or, as Robinson (2008: 436) 
characterizes it, ‘rehabilitative punishment’. 
This requires the government to look further than the punishment agenda by 
balancing their own obligations to society with individuals’ obligations not to commit 
crime. This leads to a sociological view of criminal justice interventions in which the 
government has a moral duty to reduce structural inequality in order to reduce future 
problematic drug use, and to begin the process at the agency level by balancing 
rehabilitative and penal interventions: 
[E]veryone has a right to minimal need satisfaction, and [we] question the state’s 
right to punish those whose basic needs have not been met … it is contradictory to 
regard someone as capable of doing better… and then not help them attain at least 
the minimal wherewithal to do just that. (Doyal and Gough, 1991, cited in Lewis, 
2005: 123) 
It would be negligent to uphold the premise that agency level medical, social and 
psychological interventions alone constitute ‘rehabilitation’ because this fails to 
consider the structural social and economic contexts in which individual drug users 
live. It would be equally naïve to assume that tackling structural inequality at the 
societal level would alone have immediate rehabilitative effects on the problematic 
drug users of today, due to the protracted nature of social change. To achieve 
justice, interventions must therefore promote the structural availability of alternative 
opportunities through social policy, whilst more immediately, and within the remit of 
probation-managed drug interventions, they should promote the capacity of 
offenders to identify and engage in appropriate opportunities through agency level 
work. This means identifying and tackling obstacles to desistance through 
education, employment, health and finance work as well as working on individual 
motivation and capacity to change, a dual approach supported by extensive 
research on desistance: 
Desistance … needs individual effort and agency (on the part of offenders), support 
for individuals (on the part of family members, supervisors and relevant 
agencies), and structural support (in terms of there being work, education, validation 
as a proper member of society). (Farrall et al., 2010 in Shapland et al., 2012: 23) 
Explanations of crime which ignore structure or agency assume individuals to be 
‘superdupes’ or ‘superagents’ respectively (Farrall and Bowling, 1999). In the case 
of drug use this refers to the extent to which users are seen to choose their lifestyle 
versus being subsumed by it, a debate central to justice as it predicts levels of 
punitiveness in drug policy. Where high levels of agency are assumed to cause 
drug use, individuals are deemed responsible for their own actions and in need of 
punishment. Perceptions of the bearing of structural and agentic influences on drug 
use have therefore loaded historical policy pendulum swings towards retribution or 
rehabilitation respectively, in some cases producing lessons in ‘what doesn’t work’, 
including disproportionate welfarism, excessive punitiveness, and retributive or 
‘revanche’ sentencing (Melossi, 2000: 311). 
Balancing structure and agency: A social capital theory of 
desistance and persistence 
Balancing structure and agency in policy is therefore crucial as it translates into 
justice in practice by getting the balance right between sanctions and rehabilitation; 
enforcement and reintegration. This means drug policy must appreciate the 
individualized nature of problematic use at the agency level as well as the structural 
impacts of criminalization and socio-economic constraints on desistance (McNeill, 
2009; Mair, 2004). 
Such balance has been endorsed in sentencing for problematic drug users in 
probation-managed community sentences, namely the Drug Treatment and Testing 
Order (DTTO) (initiated by the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act), and its successor the 
Drug Rehabilitation Requirement (DRR) (an option in the ‘Community Sentence’ of 
the 2003 Criminal Justice Act), in their commitment to treatment, support and 
punishment for those whose drug use is deemed to be crime driven. The policy is 
more a framework than a prescription, allowing the sentence to be tailored to 
individual probationers, not least through the ‘review’ element of the sentence in 
which good progress can be rewarded or poor progress challenged. This suggests 
that (at least in principle), the DRR has a unique capacity to respond to differing 
levels of structural and agentic causation, both across different problematic drug 
users and throughout the sentence of individual users, as these dynamics change 
with time. 
The contention of this article is that to respond appropriately, and moreover justly, 
to structural and agentic factors, requires criminal justice professionals to gain a 
detailed understanding of individual probationers’ lives, and that the concept of 
social capital is an important evaluative tool in assessing the extent to which this is 
achieved in policy and practice. 
Methodology and theory development 
Housing, education, employment, health, thinking skills and social support are well-
established as factors associated with desistance (Home Office, 2004; Social 
Exclusion Unit, 2002). Whilst their importance is evidenced, the mechanisms by 
which these factors work together to produce either desistance or persistence are 
not well understood (Farrall, 2004). Relatedly, how these should translate into 
policy responses is unclear. For instance, how can sentencing accommodate the 
fact that some elements of problematic drug use are about agency, i.e. individuals 
making choices, which may require enforcement action; or about structure, i.e. 
having choices constrained, which requires rehabilitation? Can policy have the 
flexibility to respond to the fact that this differs by individual? By exploring the 
elements that make up social capital, the research facilitated a better understanding 
of these key areas where there were obstacles to desistance from drug use and 
offending. This in turn offered insight into appropriate responses. 
A comprehensive review of the desistance, drug use and social capital literature 
was used to establish an empirically informed theoretical framework in which 
desistance processes might be better understood. The theory was then applied and 
refined through an 18-month qualitative longitudinal study of an English DTTO and 
later DRR. The two programmes were very similar with the exception of the DRRs 
increased target group to include lower-level users. They are hereafter referred to 
simply as the DRR, for brevity. The research included two one-month observations 
of the programmes with a 12-month interval and individual semi-structured 
interviews with 22 probationers, six of whom were selected as case studies (three 
desistors and three persistors). The probationers were all adult offenders (six 
females, sixteen males), all users of class A substances and ranging from 19 to 36 
in age. For confidentiality purposes, pseudonyms are used throughout; the location 
of the DRR is referred to as ‘Midtown’ and all probationer and staff names have 
been changed. 
Firstly social capital was operationalized. Social capital refers to ‘the ability of actors 
to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks and other social 
structures’ (Portes, 1998: 6). It is realized through relationships (Sampson et al., 
1999). The research was careful to avoid tautology by distinguishing 
between sources of social capital (or individuals who have the required capital) 
and resources (the types of capital possessed by an individual) (Portes, 1998). 
Many theorists have characterized the attributes of relationships which facilitate 
social capital exchange, a number of which are commonly identified, including: 
shared norms, obligations, reciprocity, trust, rewards and sanctions (see for 
example Coleman, 1988 and Hagan and McCarthy, 1997). 
These attributes were used to consider the lives of the probationers in the study. 
‘Norms’, ‘values’ and ‘tutelage’ helped to highlight how people thought and learned, 
and the basis of their decision-making; ‘investments’ reflected what they currently 
valued and invested in; and ‘rewards’ reflected the outcomes of investing in the 
opportunities available. This drew attention to the critical issue of relationships and 
consideration of why probationers invested in some groups and not others. This 
necessitated consideration of agentic choices and preferences, but also of the 
types of ‘capital’ accessible through probationers’ relationships, which was 
influenced by structural factors. 
The influences and outcomes of different types of social capital range from positive 
(socially legitimate, promoting cohesion, law abiding) to negative (socially 
illegitimate, often self-serving, and illegal). These are respectively described here 
as licit and illicit social capital, referring to the legal ramifications as well as the 
social impacts. These typologies represent the ends of a spectrum of social capital 
rather than a dichotomy. Indeed, developing on from the early proponents of the 
concept in the social sciences (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000), 
this article suggests, and indeed demonstrates, that all individuals possess social 
capital, but that desistance and offending are processes in which the balance of licit 
and illicit social capital differ. 
The empirical research for this article explored this hypothesis by examining the 
social capital of probationers subject to the DRR; the factors which influenced the 
balance between licit and illicit social capital; and the outcomes of the balances in 
terms of offending and desistance. Consideration of social capital thereby served 
to highlight the processes (both within and beyond the probation office door) by 
which transitions into and out of problematic drug use occurred. 
Hypothetical models of desistance and persistence social capital were developed 
from the literature and the models then ‘tested’ and developed by comparing them 
to those of the probationers in the study. Persistence and desistance are 
trajectories not static states, meaning that to ‘test’ the models meant examining 
‘snapshots’ of probationers’ current investments and outcomes. To achieve this, 
the empirical work started with the outcome (evidence of a persistence or 
desistance trajectory in the probationers observed, based on their own and 
probation professionals’ perceptions) and working backwards from it, asking by 
which mechanisms outcomes were produced: who invested what, in whom, in what 
context, why and how did this engender the outcome? This approach is a 
development of Pawson and Tilley’s (1997)Realistic Evaluation method. 
Mapping the findings of the desistance literature and the empirical work onto the 
social capital framework resulted in the production of what can usefully be termed 
‘portfolios’ which highlight the relationships of probationers and serve as a visual 
representation of those in whom they did or did not invest. The portfolio maps were 
used to track the influence of both agency and structure on these decisions and the 




The theory framework: Portfolios, licit and illicit social capital 
The theory, developed from the examination of probationers’ relationships, was that 
problematic drug users’ portfolios of social capital were dominated by illicit and 
lacking in licit. This was demonstrated by persistor probationers’ significant 
investments in relationships with those who were possessors of high levels of illicit 
social capital. This is illustrated here in a model of a ‘persistor’ portfolio (Figure 1), 
in which investments in licit relationships are outweighed by illicit investments. This 
pattern of investments was common to all of the persistor case studies. Equally the 
reverse was true of those currently on a desistance trajectory, in that their licit 
investments outweighed illicit. 
Figure 1 
  
This is not to suggest that the lives of probationers are predetermined to drug use 
and offending by their social capital sources or resources, or that they are subject 
to a social pathology that makes criminality inevitable. The acknowledgement of 
individual choice, and the impact of agentic evaluation of value, separates this 
theory from sociological positivism. Rather the research demonstrates that 
probationers make choices about where and in whom they invest but that these 
choices can be constrained by structural factors (i.e. outside their immediate 
control). This means that both individual change and more positive social 
conditions are required to make the transition from persistence to desistance 
trajectories, a finding consistent with Farrall’s extensive longitudinal study of 
probationers (2002). 
Where individuals choose not to engage with licit social capital (agentic factors), 
or cannot access licit resources to make such an investment worthwhile (structural 
factors), probationers’ portfolios can become subjugated by illicit social capital. 
Increasing the value of licit social capital, and the devaluation of illicit social capital, 
are therefore crucial to desistance. This happens through structural activity in terms 
of access to opportunities as well as agentic action in terms of choice, or 
engagement with those opportunities. 
The impacts of policy, practice and relationships on social capital 
Here, contemporary policy and recent developments in probation are considered 
using the social capital theory as a critical lens. Space limitations prevent coverage 
of all the study findings, so a range of well-established desistance factors have 
been selected for discussion – education, employment, social groups and housing. 
The consideration of probationers’ relationships and social capital highlighted both 
the interaction and impacts of structure and agency on decision-making and the 
influences of policy, practice and individual lifestyles on desistance or persistence 
trajectories. 
Licit diversions? The impact of social groups, employment and education on 
desistance 
Class A drug use was rarely intermittent amongst the probationers. The 
pervasiveness of the use of these drugs appeared to suffocate licit activity. Many 
described how, as problematic drug use increasingly occupied their lives, other 
pursuits were sidelined. This included loss of relationships with those who could not 
accept their lifestyle through conflicting norms, and loss of opportunities through 
broken trust. An example of this was Ian who, during his initial experimentation with 
heroin, lied to his employer that various family members had died to cover for leave 
taken illegitimately. He was caught and dismissed, and felt it was from this point on 
that his drug use escalated. As with many others, Ian’s illicit social capital both 
exacerbated and filled the void left by lost licit capital. 
For the opposite process to occur, the DRR needed to help probationers to replace 
what they perceived as the value of drug use and offending. Many reported 
producing adequate incomes from employment in fencing and dealing, and a 
number of interviewees described the ‘buzz’ of using drugs, shoplifting and 
burglary. The ‘void’ left by desistance therefore needed to be filled with licit activity 
which was equally as stimulating and rewarding. The capacity of the DRR to deliver 
such activity was demonstrated in some college sessions and group work. These 
occasions provided probationers with something to do outside of their normal 
routines − ‘being here beats what I’d normally be doing which is walking the streets 
all day every day’ (Ricky, probationer). Other probationers suggested that DRR 
activities broke the illicit norm of thinking continually about criminal occupations, by 
engaging their minds in productive (or licit) activity. One said that drug use and 
offending had become so normal for him that he had forgotten how to think and 
problem solve in any other capacity − ‘it does help just to do maths and English − 
it gets your brain working again’ (Alex, probationer). However, the DRR 
experienced instability in that these aspects of the programme were funded by 
short-term finance and contracts. This meant education and employment providers 
were often bought in for a number of months and then replaced, which interrupted 
the continuity of provision. This resulted in few genuine or long-term prospects for 
education and training, reducing the value of licit alternatives to drug use and 
offending offered by the DRR. 
In terms of employment, the few probationers who did manage to access legitimate 
work suggested this gave them little time to consider re-offending or drug use and 
increased their opportunities for licit relationships. This is consistent with research 
which found that increasing the employability of probationers helped ‘address social 
exclusion, and thus tackle crime and drug use’ (McSweeney et al., 2004: 51). Their 
investment in their new roles engendered new norms of regular working hours and 
legitimate occupations, suggesting a new identity with which offending would be 
inconsistent. For example, Jenna said as a new employee she had a responsibility 
not to let her employer down. She felt obliged to reciprocate his trust, particularly 
since she recognized the risk he had taken in employing an ex-offender; ‘not 
everyone would have let me in the shop with my history’ (Jenna, probationer). 
However, the ability of the DRR to help probationers establish employment and 
education was often limited by structural factors beyond the control of the staff, such 
as the low levels of employment opportunities in Midtown and the likelihood of 
employers accepting (ex)offenders into their businesses. Staff reported that it was 
also difficult to convince probationers of the value of licit work when the types of 
employment available were generally manual, tedious and low paid. Jimmy 
confirmed this, saying he realized how much money he could make from drug 
dealing when he was made redundant, and that since he had a criminal record, this 
was an easier and higher income than he could earn legitimately. Additionally, 
policy paradoxically caused some probationers to lose access to work because 
accepting employment meant losing benefits and the time constraints of attending 
the DRR daily precluded regular working hours. 
Many probationers described the social isolation that could result from attempts to 
desist. Having grasped that their norms and values were unlikely to change whilst 
spending time in close proximity to other problematic drug users, a large number of 
probationers explained their strategies for escaping illicit groups. These included 
moving to other areas, switching from illicit to licit friendship groups, changing where 
they ‘hung out’, moving house and living alone. All of these strategies meant losing 
social networks. The DRR had the capacity to intervene by helping fill this void, 
facilitating opportunities for new, licit relationships with staff, family and community 
groups. However, these opportunities were countered by the increasing likelihood 
of contact with other using probationers at the DRR office. As a significant majority 
of probationers stated in their interviews, putting problematic drug users together 
encouraged collaborative using, offending, justification, learning and obligations; 
essentially producing and transmitting illicit social capital norms, investment, 
tutelage and reciprocity respectively. 
Even when licit social capital opportunities arose, probationers needed to be 
convinced that they had the capacity to engage in relationships with the sources. 
As Jason pointed out: 
It can be a vicious circle. I know I need a home, a job and to be around my kids and 
family to get clean. But those things just aren’t available to me just now. I don’t know 
where to start. (Jason, probationer) 
One-to-one sessions gave probation officers the capacity to counsel individual 
probationers in how to go about accessing and engaging in such relationships and 
opportunities. In these sessions, staff often explained how to communicate and 
engage with different groups, and how to approach requests for help, support or 
information from licit friends, family, employers and organizations. This is known as 
bonding, bridging and linking capital; or capital exchange within social groups, 
across social groups, and between individuals and institutions, respectively. In the 
first observation phase, one-to-one work formed a significant element of 
programme delivery. However, by the second phase, DRRs had begun to filter in, 
replacing the DTTO, and the broader target group resulted in greater numbers and 
higher probationer-to-officer ratios. This led to an increase in the use of group work 
and limited the time available for one-to-one sessions. At the time this was 
problematic as the accredited programmes left little time for individual attention or 
collaborative relationship work between probationers and their officers. 
Clearly the DRR had limited capacity to influence the level of licit structural 
opportunities. It could not provide resources where none existed in the community 
(such as appropriate housing or employment) and this was exacerbated by the fact 
that the staff themselves were under-resourced. However, this is not to say that 
there was not a role for the DRR in such interventions. A more logical and long-
term approach would be to help probationers to establish where, in their own 
networks, such licit opportunities might be available. Many families proved 
themselves capable of being sources and accessing resources of licit social capital 
on probationers’ behalf. For example, the four probationers who had jobs all 
accessed them through their parents. This suggested the role of the DRR could 
simply have been to help probationers identify the licit resources they needed, and 
how to bond, bridge and link in order to build relationships with people who were 
sources of such capital. 
This finding is supported by other research which suggests that probation-managed 
drug interventions have less impact on desistance than probationers’ own lifestyles, 
making the improvement of social functioning and relationships outside the 
probation office door increasingly important (Eley et al., 2002). Likewise, Farrall 
(2004) suggests that strengthening social capital through work with employers and 
families is much more likely to engender positive outcomes. Such work seems more 
likely to foster permanent rather than short-term desistance, in that probationers 
will be supported by their own peers, families and associates in the community − 
support which is more accessible and will outlast DRR intervention. 
Safer housing? The impact of living arrangements on desistance 
Contemporary analysis of OASys data has identified the significant role of housing 
in the desistance and persistence trajectories of probationers: 
Drug misuse and accommodation were the offending-related needs most predictive 
of reconviction. (Howard, 2006: 1) 
The social theory of problematic drug use helped determine why accommodation 
had this effect, in demonstrating that housing significantly impacted on the proximity 
and influence of different social capital types. From the observations and interviews 
it was clear that probationers were rarely able to desist whilst living with other users. 
Ryan explained that lacking opportunities to live with licit social capital sources 
resulted in reliance on illicit sources, and accordingly unavoidable exposure to drug 
use and offending. Likewise Kyle said that staff interventions were currently of no 
use to him as he could not implement any of their guidance whilst living on the 
streets amongst other users. 
Equally, structural issues such as being forced to move house could break 
supportive, licit bonds. For example when Carrie was convicted of blackmail, she 
was ordered by a magistrate to leave the area in which her co-defendant lived. This 
meant she lost access to her old flat, non-using friends and family. The only people 
she knew in Midtown were those on the DRR, which made her reliant on them for 
resources such as accommodation, emotional support and friendship. To bond with 
these illicit sources required further investment in drug using norms and values, or 
as Carrie aptly described it, ‘eventually you just accept what they're up to as normal. 
It becomes your normal’. It seemed no coincidence that Carrie deteriorated from 
controlled to chaotic use during her time on the programme in Midtown. 
Housing could equally increase the likelihood of desistance. Probationers generally 
felt invested in when they were offered housing with sources of licit social capital 
and accordingly felt obliged to reciprocate. Many developed more licit norms 
through the promise of rewards (housing provision) for licit behaviour and concern 
about sanctions (the removal of housing opportunities) for illicit behaviour. Ian said 
he had been told by a local housing association that he could move into a new 
rented property only when he had provided four weeks of drug-free samples, and 
Russ said he had been warned by his family that if he used drugs or re-offended 
he would be asked to leave. Russ’s mum was a social worker who housed foster 
children. He understood her need to keep drug use away from their home and had 
been drug free for the last six months. 
At the structural level there was a lack of social housing in Midtown making it difficult 
to prevent the shared time, investment and resultant shared norms of probationers 
living together. This left many probationers caught in the trap of living amongst other 
users, compounding the likelihood of persistence. Kyle’s homelessness was a 
significant contributor to his drug use, offending and lack of ability to conform to 
programme rules. For instance not having a clock or watch made timekeeping 
difficult. Probation staff agreed that homelessness was Kyle’s principal obstacle to 
desistance, but also that it was outside their control. On three separate occasions 
officers were observed calling the local hostel and housing associations for him, to 
be told that there was no accommodation available. 
Some licit social capital sources were simply not prepared to share resources with 
problematic drug users. The local college was one example. Whilst allowing 
probationers to attend classes there, the college mandated that they had separate 
rooms and teachers, in order that they did not ‘contaminate’ their own students. 
Probationers said this was laughable since the college was notorious for drug 
problems amongst its own students anyway. Eventually, most classes took place 
in the DRR office, meaning that probationers were not integrating with their local 
community. This demonstrated how DRR impacts could be restricted by the extent 
to which others were prepared to invest in probationers, as well as highlighting the 
difficulty of engendering structural opportunities. 
Notably, structural opportunities had to be accompanied by agentic choice for 
desistance to occur. A number of probationers were in stable accommodation with 
emotional support on offer but were failing to desist, and some were in unstable 
accommodation or homeless yet working hard to desist. The latter was 
demonstrated by a small number of probationers who developed strategies to 
escape the activities of their cohabiters if they were forced to live with drug using 
offenders. For example, Jeremy was stabilized on a methadone script and rarely 
tested positive for heroin because he only ever slept in the hostel he lived in, where 
drug use was rife. For the rest of the day he deliberately invested his time in 
activities outside the hostel, attending the DRR for longer hours than required and 
in the evening attending reading groups and a weekly guitar workshop. 
At the level of agency, housing mirrored the other desistance factors, in that 
probationers required not only legitimate opportunities (that is, accommodation or 
at least time away from other users), but needed to value those opportunities 
enough to invest − ‘the creation of social capital requires its own investments’ 
(Farrall, 2004: 67). In accommodation with sources of licit social capital this meant 
valuing the person they were living with enough to share or at least respect their 
norms and values, and when living amongst illicit sources required investment in 
non-drug using activities away from home. Whilst unable to assist in producing 
social housing at the structural level, the DRR was still able to support desistance 
trajectories in this area, by providing alternative occupations during the day, referral 
and guidance regarding licit occupations in the evening, supporting probationers’ 
access to accommodation with licit social capital sources, and interventions such 
as motivational interviewing and relapse prevention work to help prepare 
probationers to reject the norms and values of illicit cohabiters. 
Policy, practice and justice implications 
In policy, drug use is often seen more as a choice than a compulsion due to 
evidence discrediting conceptions of drugs as intrinsically addictive (Erickson and 
Cheung, 1999). But such decisions can be constrained by deprivation either 
preceding or resulting from drug use, through labelling, criminal justice segregation 
and ‘war on drugs mentality’ (Buchanan, 2004). The solution to the structure and 
agency divide then is to find a balance; an equilibrium where both individual and 
socio-economic contributors to problematic drug use are acknowledged and 
tackled. It was clear from the findings of the research that to achieve this balance, 
probation drug policy and practice should focus on individual probationers’ 
relationships and their associated resources (or the ‘social capital portfolios’ of 
problematic drug users) as this facilitates an understanding of the contribution of 
agentic and structural factors in each individual case, highlighting the most 
appropriate response for that person. The theory therefore proves a valuable 
benchmark for evaluating contemporary policy. 
Considerations and recommendations for drug policy 
Within the policy framework, DRR practice continues to develop and to date there 
is a dearth of large-scale evaluation of its effectiveness (Hollingworth, 
2008; McSweeney et al., 2008). However, the social capital theory demonstrates 
that the sentence may overlook important relationship dynamics in a number of 
areas. Firstly, DRR implementation policy (National Probation Service, 
2005a, 2005b, 2007) reduced probationers’ contact with Probation Officers except 
for enforcement purposes. The social capital theory suggests that this was 
problematic in that probationers fail to develop relationships with their officers if they 
do not feel ‘invested in’, which demonstrably has detrimental impacts on retention 
and compliance (Laub et al., 1995). Secondly, the broadening of the DRR remit to 
include lower level users increased numbers of probationers sentenced to the order 
and resulted in the use of more generic group programmes (including Addressing 
Substance Related Offending and Offender Substance Abuse programmes), rather 
than individual approaches such as one-to-one counselling and support. The social 
capital theory suggests that this again was problematic as it overlooked the 
importance of probationers developing individual relationships with programme 
staff and resultantly prevented interventions being tailored to the different balances 
of agentic and structural influence on individuals’ drug use and offending. This may 
change, however, as programmes become more relationship-focused as part of the 
Offender Engagement Programme (Travers, 2012), an issue discussed later in this 
article (see page 14). 
Finally, it was the original intention that probationers should see the same judge or 
magistrate at court reviews, based on evidence of the effectiveness of this from US 
drug court modules (Listwan et al., 2003). Scottish drug court research found that 
this contact should focus on ‘productive lifestyles’ and recognition of drug use as 
relapsing condition (McIvor, 2004) through interpretations of National Standards 
which relied more on rewards for success to encourage desistance than 
enforcement and punity through revocation and imprisonment (Hedderman and 
Hough, 2004). The results of these orders spoke for themselves, vindicating the 
flexibility and pragmatism of the Scottish model: 
Unlike England and Wales, few orders were revoked and probationers reported 
significant reductions in drug use and offending at six months. (Eley et al., 2002) 
This resulted in higher retention and lower long-term recidivism − 66% had re-
offended two years after the DTTO in Scotland compared with 86% in the rest of the 
UK. (Stevens et al., 2005) 
Again, the social capital theory helps explain such findings, in that only if 
probationers feel invested in through the development of a relationship with the 
criminal justice professional will they care about their approval (or disapproval) in 
the review process, a finding confirmed by work on desistance-focused probation 
practice (McNeill, 2006). However, the DRR policy diluted this important element of 
the programme by making it good practice rather than a requirement, and, worse 
still, allowed for reviews to occur without probationers present, suggesting that they 
only need attend in cases of ‘poor progress’ (National Probation Service, 2005b). 
This was a clear demonstration of policy misunderstandings about the importance 
of both sanctions and rewards, and the development of investment and reciprocity, 
in order for desistance to occur. 
These DRR oversights regarding the importance of relationships may be set to 
change. Extant desistance and policy-evaluation literature (see for example Burnett 
and McNeill, 2005; Robinson, 2005) and reports prepared for NOMS specifically 
(McNeill and Weaver, 2010), and the government generally, have requisitioned the 
(re)centralization of relationships in probation policy: 
The value which really effective Probation Officers can add comes primarily from 
direct contact with offenders … it is imperative that NOMS and individual trusts take 
steps to increase the proportion of their time that probation staff spend with 
offenders. (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2011: 18) 
The Ministry of Justice collated and acknowledged considerable research evidence 
on this topic (Ministry of Justice, 2010) and responded to the Justice Committee in 
a parliamentary report (Ministry of Justice, 2011a), which was brought to fruition in 
policy by a relaxing of National Standards (Ministry of Justice, 2011b) in order to 
allow greater probation discretion. Increased discretion does offer the opportunity 
for the re-centralization of relationships to probation practice, but the actual 
outcomes remain to be seen. Current evidence, whilst anecdotal, suggests that 
training for the ‘new generation’ of probation may make the development of 
relationships with probationers a difficult transition for some officers: 
The removal of the social work background training was the biggest mistake 
probation undertook [sic]…. A generation of probation staff who are accustomed to 
using enforcement now have to make decisions based on professional judgment. A 
difficult task to achieve when you have been taught… to follow stringent guidelines 
and standards with very little flexibility to breath [sic] never mind spend 20 minutes 
with an offender. If you happened to let it slip that you spent 20 minutes with an 
offender Senior Managers would single individuals out and label them as having 
problems with their time management and lacking in prioritisation skills. (Knight, 
2011 in Parliamentary eConsultation, 2011) 
Despite this, a policy commitment to relationships is clearly demonstrated here, 
buttressed by the current Home Office Offender Engagement Programme which 
has the stated purpose of ‘improving the effectiveness of one-to-one engagement 
between the probation practitioner and the offender in order to reduce reoffending’ 
(Rex and Ellis, 2012). This offers optimism that the (re)emergence of the pivotal 
nature of relationships has begun to translate (back) into probation policy. 
From theoretical, policy and practice perspectives, what is critical about these 
relationships is their capacity for probation officers to assist probationers in altering 
their own social environments. This might be exploring how to make more 
considered decisions about those in whom they invest, or where probationers have 
low access to potential sources of licit social capital, officers have the capacity to 
offer ‘brokerage’ by supporting them in building relationships (potentially outside 
their intimate communities) which offer licit resources. 
Policy is about what makes sense to the public rather than solely what is just, but 
social capital theory in practice can fulfill the requirements of both. ‘Tough on crime’ 
strategy maintained support previously because it had few realistic challengers. But 
rehabilitative support, as suggested by the social capital theory, could realistically 
be such a challenger. Where ‘tough on crime’ policies assumed lack of control as 
the cause of crime, rehabilitative support also considers lack of licit social capital 
and in doing so attempts to dismantle both agency- and structural-level obstacles 
to desistance. In this respect, the theory has a significant practice evidence-base 
in achieving greater levels of desistance and the notion of social support makes 
sense to the public, is evidenced-based and most of all is humane (Cullen et al., 
1999). Public support for punishment is no longer guaranteed; particularly regarding 
drug using offenders, as many no longer support the war on drugs (Lock et al., 
2002) or punitive policy (Bottoms and Wilson, 2004; Maruna and King, 2004). This 
presents an opportunity for desistance-focused rehabilitation and social 
interventions to prove their value. Applying the social capital theory of problematic 
drug use to criminal justice practice might facilitate this, and should be the 
benchmark by which it is measured: 
Future investigations of the outcomes of probation supervision should focus on the 
role of social contexts in assisting probationers to combat risk factors and ultimately 
to desist. Chiefly amongst these influences… [are] personal motivation, gaining 
employment and changes in family relations. (Farrall, 2002: 223) 
Such attention helps to identify the more important questions of how programmes 
work rather than just what works, as well as highlighting the need to acknowledge 
each individual’s personal context and resources outside the probation office. 
Focusing on probationers’ social capital portfolios makes clear both the types of 
social capital sources and resources to which they have access (structural-level 
opportunities) and their valuation of and investment in these opportunities (agency-
level influences). This establishes that the key question that ‘motivational’ work with 
probationers should ask is ‘What makes individuals invest here as opposed to there 
and what influences this?’ To achieve this, policy would need to take account both 
of social resources and probationers’ own perceptions and thinking regarding what 
they, not practitioners, see as a rewards or sanctions, by assessing how much it 
means to them. In doing so there would be an acknowledgement that probationers’ 
decisions make sense to them in their context. This process requires assessment 
of what probationers value, their related norms, and subsequent investments. 
Sentences should closely monitor, supervise and support probationers in the 
desistance process, resorting to penality only in extreme cases of wilful non-
compliance. This requires criminal justice interventions which support social 
opportunities through access to licit social capital sources and resources as well as 
helping probationers to engage in those opportunities, or: 
First, having opportunities for involvement in conventional and pro-social activities; 
second having the necessary skills to participate in these activities; and third, 
receiving reinforcement for participation. (Gorman and White, 1995: 147) 
Medical and cognitive interventions can then be employed to encourage 
probationers to value licit relationships and tackle psychological and physiological 
obstacles to desistance, whilst sociological interventions can stimulate access to 
licit sources and resources, or rewards. 
Conclusions 
The social capital theory has a number of justice implications. Allowing it to guide 
probation practice would rescue their historical recognition of the importance of 
social relationships for desistance outcomes. Interventions of this nature have an 
empirical record of being most effective in engendering desistance (Robinson and 
Crow, 2009) and the model resonates with governmental objectives: 
Social capital has a well established relationship with the outcomes policy-makers 
are most concerned with. (Harper, 2001: 4) 
Failure to theorize and engage with the individual social lives of probationers leaves 
open the prospect of a return to ‘war on drugs’ style policies, which divert attention 
away from genuine obstacles to desistance by presenting drug use as a cause not 
symptom of social problems (Johns, 1991). This would be a regretful development 
from a justice perspective in that the punishment agenda takes no account of 
structure and agency interactions in an unequal society. Moreover, from a practical 
perspective, such policies have been repeatedly proven not only to be ineffective, 
but also detrimental, precisely because they increase what this article has termed 
illicit and decrease licit social capital (Hagan, 1994, Hagan and Coleman, 
2001; Farrall, 2004; Laub et al., 1995; McNeill, 2004). 
From this we can conclude that to fully acknowledge structure and agency in drug 
policy, and thereby achieve criminal justice, the proper objectives of probation-
managed drug interventions should be: to increase individual motivation; to devalue 
illicit social capital; to make licit social capital a more attractive investment; and to 
aid that process through social capital brokerage. 
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